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1 Introduction
The seminal study by Tobin (1965) initiated an inuential literature in macroeconomics that
explores the relationship between ination and economic growth. Studies in this literature have
focused on how ination a¤ects economic growth via the accumulation of physical capital and/or
human capital.1 However, an important insight from the seminal study by Solow (1956) is that
economic growth is ultimately driven by technological progress. Therefore, it is important
to also understand the e¤ects of ination in a growth model with endogenous technological
progress. Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) explore the e¤ects of ination in the R&D-based growth
model developed by Romer (1990). However, this early study by Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) and
many subsequent studies in this branch of the literature have mostly focused on a representative-
household setting with homogeneous rms. In this study, we nd that the interdependence
between heterogeneous households and heterogeneous rms leads to novel results.
Specically, we develop a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous rms
and heterogenous households. We model rm heterogeneity in the Schumpeterian quality-
ladder model by assuming that the step size of quality improvements is randomly drawn from a
Pareto distribution. Then, to allow for endogenous rm entry, we assume that R&D entrepre-
neurs need to pay an entry cost to enter the market after observing the step size of their quality
improvements. As a result, an entrepreneur would enter the market if and only if her quality
improvement is su¢ ciently large, which in turn generates an endogenous distribution of quality
improvements that are implemented. Motivated by the empirical evidence in Piketty (2014),
we consider an unequal distribution of wealth as an important source of income inequality.
Therefore, we model household heterogeneity in the Schumpeterian model by assuming that
households have di¤erent levels of wealth in order to generate an endogenous income distrib-
ution. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on
innovation and income inequality. In summary, we nd that ination has inverted-U e¤ects on
economic growth and income inequality under endogenous rm entry.
The inverted-U e¤ect of ination on economic growth under endogenous entry of hetero-
geneous rms can be explained as follows. Ination increases the cost of R&D via the cash-
in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D and decreases the arrival rate of innovation, which is a
negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth.2 The lower rate of creative destruction however
increases the expected value of future prots and the market value of inventions, which in turn
lowers the entry threshold for quality improvements. With more inventions being implemented,
ination also has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. These positive and negative e¤ects
together generate an inverted-U e¤ect of ination on economic growth so long as the entry cost
is su¢ ciently large.
Interestingly, this inverted-U e¤ect of ination on economic growth also leads to an inverted-
U e¤ect of ination on income inequality in the Schumpeterian model. In our model, income
inequality is increasing in the ratio of wealth income to wage income. Therefore, either an
increase in the real interest rate or an increase in the value of nancial assets would increase
income inequality. Given the Euler equation under which the real interest rate is increasing in
the growth rate of consumption, the abovementioned inverted-U e¤ect of ination on economic
1See for example Stockman (1981), Abel (1985), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Gillman and Kejak (2005), Ho
et al. (2007) and Wong (2016).
2Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) also nd a negative e¤ect of ination on R&D, which is supported by empirical
evidence based on cross-country panel regressions in Chu et al. (2015).
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growth causes an inverted-U e¤ect on the real interest rate and hence also an inverted-U e¤ect
on income inequality. Furthermore, ination has both positive and negative e¤ects on the value
of nancial assets. On the one hand, by slowing down the rate of creative destruction, ination
increases the market value of monopolistic rms, which in turn increases the value of nancial
assets. On the other hand, by lowering the entry threshold for quality improvements, ination
reduces the average step size of quality improvements implemented in the market and decreases
the average markup ratio, which in turn decreases the market values of monopolistic rms and
nancial assets. Combining all these e¤ects yields an overall inverted-U e¤ect of ination on
income inequality, which exists only under endogenous entry of heterogeneous rms. We also
calibrate the model to perform a quantitative analysis and nd that our model is able to match
a growth-maximizing ination rate of 5% and an inequality-maximizing ination rate of 12%
that are estimated using cross-country panel data. Finally, we simulate the utility-maximizing
level of ination and explore how it is a¤ected by the wealth holdings of households.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. Romer (1990)
develops the seminal R&D-based growth model in which economic growth is driven by the
invention of new products. Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion
and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model in which economic growth
is driven by the innovation of higher-quality products. For tractability, these seminal studies
and many subsequent studies assume a constant step size of quality improvement. Important
exceptions include Klette and Kortum (2004) and Minniti et al. (2013). Minniti et al. (2013)
develop a Schumpeterian growth model with random step sizes of quality improvements drawn
from a Pareto distribution.3 This study extends the elegant model in Minniti et al. (2013) by
allowing for a Hopenhayn-Melitz-type entry cost to generate endogenous entry of heterogeneous
rms4 and introducing heterogenous households with di¤erent asset holdings. In other words,
this study contributes to the literature by developing a Schumpeterian growth model with two
dimensions of heterogeneity among households and rms.
This study also relates to the literature on innovation and ination. In this literature, the
seminal study by Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) analyzes the e¤ects of ination on innovation in a
variant of the Romer variety-expanding model. Subsequent studies analyze the e¤ects of ina-
tion in the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model; see for example Chu and Lai (2013), Chu and
Cozzi (2014), Chu et al. (2015), He and Zou (2016), Huang et al. (2017), Neto et al. (2017), He
(2018) and Lin et al. (2018).5 However, all these studies feature a constant step size of quality
improvement. As a result, these studies predict a monotonic relationship between ination
and economic growth, which is di¤erent from the inverted-U relationship between ination and
economic growth often found in empirical studies.6 As a result, Chu et al. (2017) develop a
monetary Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of heterogeneous rms,7 and
3A recent study by Iwaisako and Ohki (2018) develops a Schumpeterian growth model with random quality
improvements drawn from a uniform distribution.
4See also Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), Haruyama and Zhao (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom
(2010) who adapt a similar entry cost into the R&D-based growth model with heterogeneous rms, but they do
not consider random increments on the quality ladder.
5See also Funk and Kromen (2010), Benigno and Fornaro (2018) and Oikawa and Ueda (2018), who consider
sticky prices in the Schumpeterian growth model. Our study assumes exible prices in order to focus on the
e¤ects of ination on long-run growth.
6See for example Bick (2010) and Lopez-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) for recent studies.
7See also Arawatari et al. (2018) and Hori (2018) who consider monetary policy in the presence of hetero-
geneity in the productivity of R&D entrepreneurs.
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they show that their model can generate an inverted-U relationship between ination and eco-
nomic growth and match empirical estimates of the growth-maximizing ination rate under
plausible parameter values. However, all the abovementioned studies feature a representative
household; therefore, they cannot be used to analyze the implications of monetary policy on
the income distribution. Therefore, this study introduces heterogeneous households into this
literature in order to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on income inequality in addition to
innovation and economic growth.
This study also relates to the literature on innovation and income inequality. Representative
studies include Chou and Talmain (1996), Li (1998), Zweimuller (2000), Foellmi and Zweimuller
(2006), Kiedaisch (2017), Aghion et al. (2018), Grossman and Helpman (2018) and Jones and
Kim (2018). These studies focus on the relationship between income inequality and innovation.
Our study complements these interesting studies by exploring the e¤ects of monetary policy on
innovation and income inequality. Chu and Cozzi (2018) explore the e¤ects of R&D subsidies
and patent policy on income inequality, but not monetary policy. More importantly, Chu
and Cozzi (2018) focus on a Schumpeterian growth model with a constant step size of quality
improvement. We show that endogenous entry of heterogeneous rms is necessary for the
emergence of an inverted-U e¤ect of ination on income inequality that is consistent with our
empirical nding.8
In the New Keynesian literature, recent studies such as McKay and Reis (2016) and Kaplan
et al. (2018) introduce heterogeneous agents into the standard New Keynesian model to explore
the e¤ects of government policies on inequality via nominal rigidity. In the New Monetarist
literature, studies have also introduced heterogeneous agents into the search-theoretic monetary
model to explore the e¤ects of ination on inequality via search and matching frictions; see
Rocheteau et al. (2018) for a recent study and a discussion of earlier studies. Our study di¤ers
from these interesting studies by exploring the e¤ects of ination on inequality in a monetary
Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous agents in which ination a¤ects inequality via
R&D and innovation. In other words, we focus on the long-run e¤ects of monetary policy on the
macroeconomy, which complement the interesting e¤ects, emphasized by the New Keynesian
model and the search-theoretic monetary model, at di¤erent time horizons.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves the
market equilibrium of the aggregate economy. Section 3 explores the distributions of wealth
and income. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 5 provides a quantitative
analysis. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 A Schumpeterian model with heterogeneous rms and
heterogeneous households
The Schumpeterian quality-ladder model is based on Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991). We consider the monetary Schumpeterian growth model in Chu et al.
(2017) featuring (a) a CIA constraint on R&D,9 (b) lab-equipment specications for innovation
8See also Natob (2015) who nds an inverted-U e¤ect of ination on income inequality using dynamic panel
regressions with cross-country data.
9See Chu et al. (2015) for a discussion of empirical evidence for the presence of cash requirements on R&D
and also Berentsen et al. (2012) for a discussion of theoretical justications and microfoundations.
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and entry that use nal good as the input, (c) random quality improvements as in Minniti
et al. (2013) and (d) a xed entry cost that generates endogenous entry of heterogeneous
rms as in Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003). Furthermore, we follow Chu and Cozzi
(2018) to introduce heterogeneous households with di¤erent asset holdings into the monetary
Schumpeterian model.
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of households, which are indexed by h 2 [0; 1]. They have identical
homothetic preferences over consumption ct(h) but own di¤erent levels of wealth.10 Household
h has the following utility function:
u(h) =
Z 1
0
e t ln ct(h)dt, (1)
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate.
Household h supplies one unit of labor to earn wage income wt and maximizes utility u(h)
subject to
_at(h) + _mt(h) = rtat(h)  tmt(h) + itbt(h) + wt +  t   ct(h). (2)
at(h) is the real value of nancial assets (i.e., equity of monopolistic rms) owned by household
h, and rt is the real interest rate. mt(h) is the real value of cash holdings of household h, and t
is the ination rate. bt(h) is the amount of cash borrowed from household h by entrepreneurs
for R&D, and it is the nominal interest rate.11 The CIA constraint is given by bt(h)  mt(h).
Finally, the government provides a lump-sum transfer  t to each household.12
From standard dynamic optimization, household hs consumption path is given by
_ct(h)
ct(h)
= rt   , (3)
which shows that the growth rate of consumption is the same across households such that
_ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct for all h 2 [0; 1], where ct 
R 1
0
ct(h)dh denotes aggregate consumption.
Therefore, the growth rate of aggregate consumption is also given by
_ct
ct
= rt   . (4)
10Due to the householdshomothetic preferences, the aggregate economy behaves as if there is a representative
household; see for example Caselli and Ventura (2000). Nevertheless, the heterogeneity in wealth holdings still
enables us to explore the endogenous distribution of income.
11It can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on borrowing bt(h) must equal rt + t.
12The transfer is nanced by seigniorage. Alternatively, we can assume that seigniorage is used to nance
a public good, in which case all our analytical results would be the same so long as the (potentially utility-
enhancing) public good is non-productive.
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2.2 Final good
Final good yt is produced by a unit continuum of competitive rms using the following Cobb-
Douglas production function:
yt = L

tK
1 
t , (5)
where Lt is labor input and  2 (0; 1) measures labor intensity in production. Kt is a composite
of a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods kt(j) given by
Kt = exp
Z 1
0
ln kt(j)dj

. (6)
From prot maximization using (5), the conditional demand function for Lt is
wtLt = yt. (7)
From prot maximization using (5) and (6), the conditional demand function for kt(j) is
pt(j)kt(j) = (1  ) yt, (8)
where pt(j) is the price of kt(j).13
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. In each industry j, there is a
monopolistic industry leader, who holds a patent on the latest technology and dominates the
market until the arrival of the next innovation.14 The production function of the leader in
industry j is
kt(j) = qt(j; !j)xt(j), (9)
where qt(j; !j) is the quality-level of the leader in industry j and !j is an integer denoting the
quality vintage of the intermediate goods produced by the leader in industry j. xt(j) is the
quantity of input j produced using nal good with an one-to-one technology (i.e., xt(j) units of
nal good produce xt(j) units of input j). From Bertrand competition, the equilibrium price
of kt(j) is a markup over the marginal cost 1=qt(j; !j) given by
pt(j) =
t(j)
qt(j; !j)
, (10)
where the markup ratio t(j)  qt(j; !j)=qt(j; !j   1) is determined by the size of the quality
improvement by the leader in industry j. The equilibrium level of monopolistic prot is
t(j) =

t(j)  1
t(j)

pt(j)kt(j) =

t(j)  1
t(j)

(1  )yt  t(), (11)
where the second equality uses (8).
13Here pt(j) is denominated in units of the nal good.
14See Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of this Arrow replacement e¤ect.
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2.4 R&D and entry
In this section, we present the three steps of innovation. First, an entrepreneur invents a
higher quality product. Then, the size of the quality improvement is randomly drawn from a
Pareto distribution. Finally, if and only if the quality improvement is su¢ ciently large, then
the entrepreneur would pay a xed entry cost to enter the market.
2.4.1 Invention
R&D is performed by competitive entrepreneurs. If an entrepreneur employs Rt(j) units of
nal good to engage in innovation in industry j, then she would succeed in inventing the next
higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probability t(j) given by
t(j) = Rt(j)=t. (12)
To ensure balanced growth, t  Q(1 )=t measuring the di¢ culty of R&D is increasing the
aggregate technology level Qt,15 which is dened as
Qt  exp
Z 1
0
ln qt(j; !j)dj

. (13)
To facilitate the payment of Rt(j), the entrepreneur needs to borrow the amount Rt(j) of cash
from households, where  2 (0; 1] is the CIA parameter. The borrowing cost is determined
by the nominal interest rate it. Therefore, the total cost of R&D is (1 + it)Rt(j). Lets use
vet (j; !j + 1) to denote the expected value of an invention before the realization of the size of
its quality improvement. The R&D condition is given by
t(j)v
e
t (j; !j + 1) = (1 + it)Rt(j), vet (j; !j + 1) = (1 + it)Q(1 )=t . (14)
2.4.2 Random quality improvements
We follow Minniti et al. (2013) to assume that when an R&D entrepreneur invents a higher-
quality product in industry j, the quality step size t(j) > 1 is randomly drawn from a station-
ary Pareto distribution with the following probability density function:
f() =
1

 
1+
 , (15)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the shape of the Pareto distribution. Given that the
expected value of t(j) is equal across industries, (11) implies that the expected value et (j) of
monopolistic prot t(j) is also the same across industries such that et (j) = 
e
t for j 2 [0; 1].
Therefore, we follow the standard treatment to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which
the arrival rate of innovation is equal across industries, such that t(j) = t for j 2 [0; 1].16 As
a result, the expected value of an invention does not depend on j such that vet (j; !j + 1) = v
e
t
for j 2 [0; 1].
15Venturini (2012) provides empirical evidence for the presence of increasing R&D di¢ culty.
16Cozzi et al. (2007) provide a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique
rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
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2.4.3 Endogenous rm entry
Following Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003), we consider a xed entry cost to generate an
endogenous entry of heterogeneous rms. Lets denote vt() as the ex post value of an invention
(i.e., after the realization of the quality step size ). In this case, the entry condition is
vt()  t, (16)
where the entry cost t = Q
(1 )=
t is proportional toQ
(1 )=
t to ensure balanced growth. Given
that t() is increasing in , there exists a threshold quality level ~t above which vt()  t
for all   ~t. Also, it can be shown that vt()=Q(1 )=t is stationary in equilibrium. Then,
Lemma 1 shows that the threshold quality level ~ in vt(~) = t is stationary.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique and stationary threshold quality level ~t = ~ for all t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given the stationary threshold ~, Lemma 2 derives the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-
pected value vet of an invention. In (17), Pr(  ~) = ~
 1=
is the probability that a randomly
drawn quality step size is larger than the threshold ~.
Lemma 2 The no-arbitrage condition for the expected value vet of an invention is
rt =
et + _v
e
t + Pr(  ~) _t   Pr(  ~)t[vet + Pr(  ~)t]
vet + Pr(  ~)t
. (17)
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.5 Monetary authority
We consider the nominal interest rate it as the policy instrument, which is exogenously set by
the monetary authority. The Fisher equation is given by it = t + rt, where t  _Pt=Pt is
the ination rate and Pt is the price level of nal good. Given the aggregate nominal money
balance Mt  Ptmt, the growth rate of the aggregate nominal money balance is
t 
_Mt
Mt
= t +
_mt
mt
= it   rt + _mt
mt
= it     _ct
ct
+
_mt
mt
, (18)
where the last equality uses the aggregate consumption path in (4). It can be shown that given a
stationary nominal interest rate i, aggregate consumption ct and aggregate real money balance
mt grow at the same rate on the balanced growth path. Therefore, on the balanced growth
path, the growth rate of the nominal money balance is determined by the nominal interest rate
such that  = i   . The government uses the seigniorage revenue _Mt to nance a lump-sum
transfer  t that has a real value given by
 t =
_Mt
Pt
= t
Mt
Pt
, (19)
which yields  t = (i  )mt on the balanced growth path.
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2.6 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fct(h); at(h);mt(h); bt(h); yt; Lt; kt(j); xt(j); Rt(j)g,
a time path of prices fwt; rt; pt(j); vt()g and a time path of policies fit;  tg. Also, at each
instance of time, the following conditions hold:
 household h 2 [0; 1] maximizes utility taking fwt; rt; it;  tg as given;
 competitive rms produce nal good yt to maximize prot taking prices as given;
 monopolistic rm j 2 [0; 1] produces intermediate good kt(j) and chooses fxt(i); pt(j)g to
maximize prot;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs choose Rt(j) to maximize expected prot taking vt() as
given;
 the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that Lt = 1;
 the market-clearing condition for nal good holds such that R 1
0
ct(h)dh +
R 1
0
xt(j)dj +R 1
0
Rt(j)dj + ~
 1=
tt = yt;
 the total amount of cash owned by households equals the amount of cash borrowed by
entrepreneurs such that
R 1
0
mt(h)dh =
R 1
0
bt(h)dh = 
R 1
0
Rt(j)dj;
 the total value of assets owned by households equals the value of all monopolistic rms
such that
R 1
0
at(h)dh =
R 1
0
vt(j)dj  vt;
 the monetary authority uses seigniorage to nance a lump-sum transfer  t = _Mt=Pt.
2.7 Aggregate economy
First, we derive the growth rate of aggregate technology Qt by di¤erentiating the log of (13)
with respect to time and using the law of large numbers:
_Qt
Qt
=
Z 1
0
lnt(j)dj

Pr(  ~)t =
Z 1
~
(ln) ~f()d

~
 1=
t = (ln
~+ )~
 1=
t, (20)
where the truncated density function ~f() as a result of the threshold ~ is dened as
~f()  f()R1
~
f()d
= ~
1
f(). (21)
In (20), ~
 1=
t is the composite arrival rate of implementable quality improvements and +ln ~
is the average step size of implemented quality improvements. Then, we derive the aggregate
production function for yt in the following lemma:
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Lemma 3 The aggregate production function for yt is given by
yt =

1  
~e
Qt
 1 

. (22)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The aggregate production function in (22) implies that the growth rate of aggregate output
yt is given by
gt  _yt
yt
=
1  

_Qt
Qt
=
1  

(ln ~+ )~
 1=
t, (23)
where the last equality uses (20). Lemma 4 shows that given a stationary nominal interest rate
i, the aggregate economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which 
and g are also stationary.
Lemma 4 The aggregate economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The no-arbitrage condition for the ex-post value of an invention with   ~ is given by
t()
vt()
= r + ~
 1=
  _vt()
vt()
= + ~
 1=
, (24)
where the last equality uses the aggregate consumption path in (4) and the property that ct
and vt both grow at the steady-state equilibrium growth rate in (23). Then, substituting (11)
and (24) into the entry condition vt(~) = Q
(1 )=
t , we obtain 
~  1
~
!
1

=
(+ ~
 1=
)Q
(1 )=
t
(1  )yt . (25)
From (17), the equilibrium value of vet on the balanced growth path is determined by
et
vet + ~
 1=
t
= rt + ~
 1=
  _v
e
t +
~
 1= _t
vet + ~
 1=
t
= + ~
 1=
, (26)
where the last equality uses the aggregate consumption path in (4) and the property that ct,
vet and t all grow at the steady-state equilibrium growth rate in (23). The expected value of
monopolistic prot is given by
et =
Z 1
~

  1


f()d

(1  )yt =
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
(1  )yt. (27)
Substituting (26) and (27) into the R&D condition in (14) yields"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
1
(1 + i) + ~
 1=

=
(+ ~
 1=
)Q
(1 )=
t
(1  )yt . (28)
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Combining (25) and (28), we obtain the following condition:
(~  1)~1= = 


1 + 
1
1 + i
, (29)
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in ~. Therefore, (29) implicitly determines
the unique equilibrium value of ~ as a decreasing function in the nominal interest rate i. Using
(22), (25) and (29), we obtain the following condition:
~
 1=
 =
~
 (1=+1=)
1 + i

1 + 
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
  , (30)
which determines the unique equilibrium value of the composite innovation rate ~
 1=
. The
right-hand side of (30) is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i for a given value of ~; however,
~ is also decreasing in i. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of i on ~
 1=
 is ambiguous. The following
proposition summarizes the overall e¤ects of i on ~
 1=
 and g.
Proposition 1 If the entry cost parameter  is su¢ ciently large (small), then the nominal
interest rate i has an inverted-U e¤ect (a monotonically negative) on the composite innovation
rate ~
 1=
 and the equilibrium growth rate g.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, when the entry cost  is zero, the nominal interest rate i has no e¤ect on the
distribution of quality improvements that are implemented because all rms enter the market.
In this case, the entry threshold becomes ~ = 1, and the equilibrium growth rate g = 1 


is monotonically decreasing in the nominal interest rate i via the innovation arrival rate .
However, when the entry cost  is positive, the nominal interest rate i a¤ects the entry threshold
~ in addition to the innovation arrival rate . In this case, Pr(  ~) = ~ 1= is increasing
in the nominal interest rate i because an increase in the nominal interest rate i reduces the
entry threshold ~ and leads to more quality improvements being implemented. Intuitively, the
nominal interest rate i has a negative e¤ect on the arrival rate  of future innovations, which
in turn increases the expected value of the prot stream generated by an implemented quality
improvement and decreases the minimum quality step size that makes incurring the entry cost
protable. Overall, the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate i on the composite innovation rate
~
 1=
 and the equilibrium growth rate g = 1 

(ln ~+ )~
 1=
 become ambiguous and follow
an inverted-U pattern when the entry cost  is su¢ ciently large.
3 Wealth and income distributions
In this section, we show that the wealth distribution is stationary and exogenously determined
by its initial distribution. Then, we show that the income distribution is also stationary but
endogenously a¤ected by the nominal interest rate.
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3.1 Wealth distribution
In equilibrium, household h 2 [0; 1] lends all its cash to entrepreneurs such that mt(h) = bt(h).
Substituting this condition into (2) yields
_at(h) + _bt(h) = rt[at(h) + bt(h)] + wt +  t   ct(h), (31)
where we have also used the Fisher equation rt = it   t. Aggregating (31) for all h, we have
_at + _bt = rt(at + bt) + wt +  t   ct. (32)
Lets denote zt(h)  at(h) + bt(h) as household hs wealth, which consists of nancial assets
and bond holdings. Then, we dene sz;0(h)  z0(h)=z0 as the initial share of wealth owned
by household h, and sz;0(h) is exogenously given at time 0. We consider a general distribution
function of initial wealth share with a mean of one and a standard deviation of z > 0.
Taking the log of wealth share sz;t(h)  zt(h)=zt at time t and di¤erentiating the resulting
expression with respect to time yield
_sz;t(h)
sz;t(h)
=
_zt(h)
zt(h)
  _zt
zt
=
ct   wt    t
zt
  ct(h)  wt    t
zt(h)
. (33)
Then, (33) can be re-expressed as
_sz;t(h) =
ct   wt    t
zt
sz;t(h)  sc;t(h)ct   wt    t
zt
, (34)
where sc;t(h)  ct(h)=ct is the share of consumption by household h at time t. Taking the log
of sc;t(h) and di¤erentiating the resulting expression with respect to time yield
_sc;t(h)
sc;t(h)
=
_ct(h)
ct(h)
  _ct
ct
. (35)
Given that _ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct from (3) and (4), (35) becomes _sc;t(h) = 0 for all t, which in
turn implies sc;t(h) = sc;0(h) for all t.17 Given that fat; bt; zt; ct; wt;  tg all grow at the same
rate g in equilibrium, (34) represents a one-dimensional di¤erential equation, which describes
the potential evolution of sz;t(h) given an initial sz;0(h). In Appendix A, we show that the
coe¢ cient on sz;t(h) in (34) is positive and equal to . Together with the fact that sz;t(h) is a
state variable, the only solution consistent with long-run stability is _sz;t(h) = 0 for all t, which
is achieved by consumption share sc;t(h) jumping to its steady-state value shown in Appendix
A. Lemma 5 shows that as an equilibrium outcome, the wealth distribution is stationary and
remains the same as the initial distribution, which is exogenously given at time 0.18
Lemma 5 The wealth share of household h 2 [0; 1] is given by sz;t(h) = sz;0(h) for all t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
17sc;0(h) is an endogenous variable to be determined in Appendix A.
18See also Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) who show the stationarity of the wealth distribution in an
AK growth model.
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3.2 Income distribution
From (31), income earned by household h is given by
It(h) = rtzt(h) + wt. (36)
Aggregating (36) yields total income earned by all households given by
It = rtzt + wt. (37)
Combining (36) and (37) yields the share of income earned by household h given by
sI;t(h)  It(h)
It
=
sz;0(h) rtzt + wt
rtzt + wt
, (38)
which also uses zt(h) = sz;t(h)zt = sz;0(h)zt from Lemma 5. The distribution function of income
share sI;t(h) has a mean of one and the following standard deviation:
I;t 
sZ 1
0
[sI;t(h)  1]2dh = rtzt
rtzt + wt
sZ 1
0
[sz;0(h)  1]2dh = rtzt=wt
1 + rtzt=wt
z, (39)
which is also the coe¢ cient of variation of income and is increasing in rtzt=wt. As discussed in
Chu and Cozzi (2018), income inequality I;t is increasing in rtzt=wt because an unequal distri-
bution of wealth is the source of income inequality in the model. Therefore, whenever interest
income rtzt increases relative to wage income wt, the degree of income inequality increases.
Lemma 6 Income inequality is increasing in the ratio of interest income to wage income.
Proof. Equation (39) shows that I;t is increasing in rtzt=wt.
Recall that total wealth is given by zt = at + bt. The amount of nancial assets at in the
economy is given by
at = vt =
Z 1
~
vt() ~f()d =
h
~
1=
(1 + i) + 
i
Q
(1 )=
t , (40)
which uses
R1
~t
vt()f()d = (1 + i)t + ~
 1=
t t. Using (7), (22) and (40), we derive
a
w
=
h
~
1=
(1 + i) + 
i (~e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= . (41)
The amount of borrowing bt in the economy is given by
bt = Rt = Q
(1 )=
t t, (42)
where the last equality uses (12). Using (7), (22) and (42), we derive
b
w
= 
(~e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= . (43)
Using (4), (41) and (43), we derive the ratio of total interest income to wage income as
rz
w
=
r(a+ b)
w
= (+ g)
h
~
1=
(1 + i) +  + 
i (~e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= , (44)
where the growth rate g, the quality threshold ~ and the innovation arrival rate  are determined
by (23), (29) and (30), respectively.
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4 Monetary policy on growth and inequality
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and income
inequality. We begin by exploring the relationship between the ination rate and the nominal
interest rate. From the Fisher equation, the ination rate is given by
 = i  r = i  g(i)  , (45)
where the last equality uses (4). Di¤erentiating the steady-state equilibrium ination rate  in
(45) with respect to the nominal interest rate i yields
@
@i
= 1  @g(i)
@i
. (46)
Therefore, so long as @g(i)=@i < 1, the relationship between the steady-state equilibrium in-
ation rate and the nominal interest rate is positive.19 This positive long-run relationship
between the ination rate and the nominal interest rate is supported by empirical studies such
as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001). In the following sections, we explore the ef-
fects of the nominal interest rate on economic growth and income inequality. It is useful to
note that any relationship between the nominal interest rate and growth/inequality would also
apply to ination and growth/inequality given the positive relationship between ination and
the nominal interest rate.
4.1 Monetary policy under a zero entry cost
We rst consider the case of a zero entry cost  = 0. In this case, the threshold quality level
becomes ~ = 1. Then, the equilibrium growth rate in (23) becomes g = 1 

, where the
innovation arrival rate  in (30) simplies to
 =
1
1 + i

1 + 
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
  , (47)
which is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i. As for the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate
i on income inequality, we know from Lemma 6 that we simply have to examine how i a¤ects
the ratio of total interest income to wage income in (44). We begin by examining separately
the e¤ects of i on ra=w and rb=w.
Under a zero entry cost, the ratio of asset interest income to wage income simplies to
ra
w
=

+
1  



1
+ 

1 + 
1  

, (48)
which uses (4), (41) and (47). Recall that the innovation arrival rate  is decreasing in the
nominal interest rate i. Therefore, (48) shows that the nominal interest rate i has two opposing
e¤ects on the ratio ra=w of asset interest income to wage income. First, an increase in i reduces
the real interest rate r =  + 1 

 by decreasing innovation and the equilibrium growth
19Under our calibrated parameter values, the equilibrium ination rate is indeed increasing in the nominal
interest rate.
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rate. This corresponds to the interest-rate e¤ect of innovation on income inequality identied
in Chu and Cozzi (2018), who consider R&D subsidies instead of monetary policy. Second,
an increase in i reduces the rate of creative destruction and raises the asset-wage ratio a=w.
This corresponds to the asset-value e¤ect of innovation on income inequality in Chu and Cozzi
(2018). Equation (48) shows that as  ! 0, the two e¤ects cancel each other. For the more
general case with  > 0, di¤erentiating ra=w in (48) with respect to i yields the following result:
@ra=w
@i
> 0,  < 
1   . (49)
Therefore, the positive asset-value e¤ect of i on income inequality dominates the negative
interest-rate e¤ect of i on income inequality if and only if  < =(1  ). This result generalizes
the one in Chu and Cozzi (2018), who consider a symmetric quality step size and nd that the
asset-value e¤ect of R&D subsidies dominates the interest-rate e¤ect of R&D subsidies if and
only if the quality step size is su¢ ciently small. In the case of asymmetric quality step sizes,
the average quality step size is increasing in . Therefore, a small value of  implies a small
average quality step size, under which the asset-value e¤ect dominates the interest-rate e¤ect
of monetary policy on income inequality.
Under a zero entry cost, the ratio of bond interest income to wage income simplies to
rb
w
=

+
1  




(e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= , (50)
which uses (4) and (43). Equation (50) shows that the ratio rb=w of bond interest income to
wage income is increasing in the innovation arrival rate , which in turn is decreasing in the
nominal interest rate i. The rst negative e¤ect is that an increase in i reduces the real interest
rate r =  + 1 

 by decreasing innovation and the equilibrium growth rate. The second
negative e¤ect is that an increase in i decreases R&D and the amount of borrowing, which in
turn decreases the bond-wage ratio b=w.
Combining (48) and (50) yields the ratio of total interest income to wage income given by
rz
w
=

+
1  



1
+ 

1 + 
1  

+ 
(e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )=

. (51)
As  ! 0, the two e¤ects of the nominal interest rate i on the ratio ra=w of asset interest
income to wage income cancel each other. In this case, we are left with the negative e¤ects
of i on the ratio rb=w of bond interest income to wage income. For the more general case in
which  > 0, the overall e¤ect of i on rz=w depends on the relative value of  and =(1   ).
If  > =(1   ), then the e¤ects of i on ra=w and rb=w are both negative. In this case, the
overall e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality is negative. If  < =(1   ),
then the e¤ect of i on ra=w is positive whereas the e¤ect of i on rb=w is negative. In this case,
the overall e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality can be positive, negative or
U-shaped. Proposition 2 summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 Given a zero entry cost parameter , an increase in the nominal interest rate
has the following e¤ects: (a) it has a negative e¤ect on income inequality if  > =(1  ) and
(b) it may have a positive, negative or U-shaped e¤ect on income inequality if  < =(1  ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
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4.2 Monetary policy under a positive entry cost
We now consider the general case of a positive entry cost  > 0. Recall that the e¤ects of the
nominal interest rate on income inequality depend on how it a¤ects the ratio of total interest
income to wage income, which depends on r, a=w and b=w. Proposition 1 shows that the nominal
interest rate has an inverted-U e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate under a su¢ ciently large
entry cost . Therefore, the nominal interest rate also has an inverted-U e¤ect on the real
interest rate r =  + g under a su¢ ciently large entry cost . It is useful to note that this
interest-rate e¤ect works through the quality threshold ~ in addition to the innovation arrival
rate  in the previous section and in Chu and Cozzi (2018).
We now consider how the nominal interest rate a¤ects the asset-wage ratio a=w. Substituting
(29) and (30) into (41) yields
a
w
=
1
+ ~
 1=

~  1=(1 + )
~
1  

, (52)
where the quality threshold ~ > 1 is determined by (29) and decreasing in the nominal interest
rate i. In the previous section with  = 0, the quality threshold is simply ~ = 1. In this special
case, the positive asset-value e¤ect works through the innovation arrival rate , which in turn
is decreasing in i. However, in the more general case with  > 0, the asset-value e¤ect also
works through the quality threshold ~ via two channels. First, as explained in the discussion of
Proposition 1, an increase in the nominal interest rate i reduces the entry quality threshold ~,
which in turn leads to more innovations being implemented and increases ~
 1=
in the composite
creative destruction rate ~
 1=
. This e¤ect works to decrease a=w as shown in (52). Second,
the lower average quality step size also reduces the average markup ratio and the average value
of monopolistic rms, which in turn decreases a=w. It is useful to note that these negative
asset-value e¤ects have the opposite sign as the one in the previous section by working through
a di¤erent channel that is the quality threshold ~, which is absent in Chu and Cozzi (2018).
We now consider how the nominal interest rate a¤ects the bond-wage ratio b=w. Substituting
(29) and (30) into (43) yields
b
w
= ~
1=
"
~  1
~
1=
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
  
#
(~e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= . (53)
Equation (53) shows that the nominal interest rate i a¤ects b=w through ~ via multiple channels.
The main e¤ect is similar to and complements the one in the previous section but once again
works through a di¤erent channel that the nominal interest rate reduces the quality threshold
and the average quality step size, which in turn decreases the average markup ratio and the
expected value of monopolistic prots. This general-equilibrium e¤ect in turn reinforces the
direct negative direct of i on R&D and the amount of borrowing as well as the bond-wage ratio
b=w.
In Section 4.1, we nd that in the case of a zero entry cost  = 0 and a positive discount
rate  > 0, an increase in the nominal interest rate has both positive and negative e¤ects on
income inequality. In this section, we nd that in the case of a positive entry cost  > 0, an
increase in the nominal interest rate has additional e¤ects on income inequality via endogenous
rm entry. Therefore, when the entry cost  and the discount rate  are both positive and
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the CIA parameter , which determines the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate, is su¢ ciently
large, we nd that an increase in the nominal interest rate has a potentially inverted-U e¤ect
on income inequality. Specically, Proposition 3 shows that the e¤ect of the nominal interest
rate on income inequality is rstly increasing and eventually decreasing.
Proposition 3 If the product of the discount rate and the entry cost (i.e., ) is positive
and the CIA parameter  is su¢ ciently large, then income inequality is rstly increasing and
eventually decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is important to note that this inverted-U e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income
inequality is di¤erent from the U-shaped e¤ect under a zero entry cost  = 0 in Proposition
2. Therefore, without the entry cost, it is impossible for the model to generate an inverted-U
e¤ect on income inequality. The reason is that as Proposition 1 shows, the nominal interest
rate has an inverted-U e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate if and only if the entry cost  is
su¢ ciently large. In other words, endogenous rm entry is necessary for the emergence of an
inverted-U e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on economic growth, which in turn generates an
inverted-U e¤ect on income inequality that is otherwise absent without endogenous rm entry.
The main mechanisms behind this inverted-U e¤ect on income inequality can be summarized
as follows. Given that the real interest rate is increasing in the growth rate of consumption,
the inverted-U e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on economic growth causes an inverted-U
e¤ect on the real interest rate. Furthermore, the nominal interest rate has both positive and
negative e¤ects on the value of assets. On the one hand, by slowing down the innovation arrival
rate, the nominal interest rate increases the market value of monopolistic rms, which in turn
increases the value of assets. On the other hand, by lowering the entry threshold for quality
improvements, the nominal interest rate reduces the average step size of implemented quality
improvements and decreases the average markup ratio, which in turn decreases the market
values of monopolistic rms and assets. Combining all these e¤ects yields an overall inverted-U
e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality, which exists only under endogenous
entry of heterogeneous rms.
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a quantitative analysis. In Section 5.1, we use cross-country data to
estimate the empirical e¤ects of ination on economic growth and income inequality. In Section
5.2, we calibrate the model to data and our regression estimates before simulating the e¤ects of
ination on growth and inequality. Section 5.3 explores how the wealth holdings of households
a¤ect ination and growth.
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5.1 Empirical estimation
To facilitate the subsequent calibration, we rst provide an empirical estimation of the e¤ects
of ination on economic growth and income inequality. Here we use cross-country panel data
to estimate the following regressions:
git = 1it + 2
2
it +  Xit + i + it,
it = !1it + !2
2
it + 
Xit + i + it,
where git denotes the growth rate of real GDP in country i at time t, it denotes the ination
rate from the Consumer Price Index in country i at time t, and it denotes income inequality
in country i at time t. The Gini index, which is a conventional measure of income inequality,
is collected from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) version 3.4. This database
also provides information on the income share of each decile group; e.g., the rst decile group
includes the poorest 10% of the population, whereas the tenth decile group includes the richest
10%. We calculate the ratio of income between the top group and the bottom group as an
alternative measure of income inequality. Xit is a vector of the following control variables: a
constant, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate, and investment risks. We follow
Fan and Gao (2017) to use the investment prole index and the corruption index from the
International Country Risk Guide to measure investment risks.20 i and i are the country
xed e¤ects.21 Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix B.
To be consistent with our innovation-driven growth model, we focus on high-income coun-
tries and consider the data from 1995 to 2014. Since the di¤erence between the maximum and
the minimum values of the ination rate in a few countries are too high (which are close to
the value of hyperination rate and much higher than the value of galloping ination rate),
we delete the top 15% outliers.22 In the rst three columns, we dene high-income countries
according to the denition given by the WIID. In the last three columns, we dene high-income
countries according to the classication given by the World Bank (WB). Table 1 shows that the
overall e¤ects of ination on economic growth and income inequality follow an inverted-U pat-
tern. The growth-maximizing ination rate is about 5%,23 whereas the inequality-maximizing
ination rate is about 12%.24
One concern about our benchmark (reduced-form) regression results is that the nominal
interest rate could enter both in the error term and ination, which may lead to an endogeneity
problem and bias our results. To address this issue, we use the lending interest rate collected
from CEIC database as an instrumental variable for the ination rate. As reported in Appendix
B, the results are still robust and the threshold values are similar to the ones in Table 1.
20We rescale these two indexes into a number between zero and ten.
21If we control year xed e¤ects instead, our results (available upon request) still hold.
22If we delete the top 5% or 10% or 20% outliers instead, the results are still signicant.
23This value is between the estimates reported in Bick (2010) and Lopez-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011).
24This estimate is much lower than the estimate in Natob (2015), who however focuses on developing countries.
18
Table 1: E¤ects of ination on economic growth and income inequality
WIID WB
growth income inequality growth income inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
it 2.368*** 0.179*** 0.159*** 1.742*** 0.184*** 0.162***
(0.506) (0.043) (0.054) (0.513) (0.043) (0.054)
2it -0.242*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.143** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.066) (0.002) (0.002) (0.062) (0.002) (0.002)
country xed e¤ect YES YES YES YES YES YES
control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
observations 612 448 448 740 452 452
R-squared 0.139 0.898 0.923 0.114 0.903 0.929
Note: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1 and 4 correspond
to the GDP growth rate. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 use di¤erent measures of income inequality. Specically, columns
2 and 5 correspond to the income di¤erence between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of the population.
Columns 3 and 6 correspond to the Gini coe¢ cient. In the rst (last) three columns, high-income countries
follow the classication by the WIID (WB).
5.2 Calibration and simulation
To perform a more realistic quantitative analysis, we generalize the model by introducing elastic
labor supply Lt(h) = 1  lt(h), where lt(h) denotes leisure. The generalized utility function is
u(h) =
Z 1
0
e t

ln ct(h) +  ln

lt(h)
(lt)"

dt, (54)
where the parameter   0 determines the importance of leisure lt(h) in utility. We also allow for
external habit, measured by the parameter " 2 [0; 1], on leisure lt 
R 1
0
lt(h)dh.25 Furthermore,
we impose a CIA constraint on consumption as in Chu and Cozzi (2014). With the additional
cash requirement on consumption, the CIA constraint becomes bt(h) + 'ct(h)  mt(h), where
the parameter ' 2 [0; 1] determines the fraction of consumption spending that is subject to the
CIA constraint. We provide detailed derivations of this generalized model in Appendix C.
We now calibrate the model to perform a quantitative analysis on the relationship between
ination and economic growth/income inequality. The model features the following structural
parameters f; ; ; ; '; ; ; ; "g and policy instrument i. We consider a range of values for
the CIA-R&D parameter  2 f0:65; 1g.26 We set the discount rate  to a conventional value
of 0.05. We set the degree of labor intensity  to a value of 0.56 in the US; see for example
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). We calibrate the leisure parameter  by matching the
25It is useful to note that the presence of external habit on leisure does not a¤ect the equilibrium allocations but
only a¤ects welfare. Therefore, the parameter " enables us to explore its implications on the utility-maximizing
ination rate without a¤ecting the equilibrium allocations. We do not include external habit on consumption
as it is well known that it leads to a counterfactual comovement between hours worked and productivity shocks.
For example, Khorunzhina (2015) nds that the counterfactual "response of hours worked [...] disappears once
habit in consumption is ruled out but habit in leisure remains".
26We nd that when  is too small, the calibrated value of  becomes greater than unity.
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average fraction of time devoted to labor supply L as 0.3. We calibrate the CIA-consumption
parameter ' using the M1-consumption ratio from 1990 to 2016 in the US. As for the Pareto
distribution parameter , we calibrate its value by matching an average TFP growth rate g
of 0.5% from 1990 to 2016 in the US. As for the R&D cost parameter  and the entry cost
parameter , we calibrate their values by matching the growth-maximizing ination rate and
the inequality-maximizing ination rate estimated in the previous section. We calibrate the
monetary policy instrument i by matching the average ination rate in the US, which is about
2.5% in the past two decades. Finally, we will consider the full range of values for the external
habit parameter " 2 [0; 1] when evaluating the welfare e¤ects of ination. The calibrated
parameter values are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibration
    '    i
1.00 0.05 0.56 1.381 0.20 0.34 2.57*10 5 0.19 0.08
0.65 0.05 0.56 1.379 0.20 0.90 3.17*10 3 0.15 0.08
Figure 1 simulates the relationship between ination and economic growth. We nd that
the relationship between ination and economic growth follows an inverted-U pattern. The
equilibrium growth rate is maximized at an ination rate of 5.0%. After that, any further
increase in ination is associated with a decline in economic growth. For example, increasing
the ination rate from 5% to 15% leads to a decrease in the equilibrium growth rate that ranges
from 0.006% (in the case of  = 0:65) to 0.007% (in the case of  = 1).
Figure 1a: Ination and growth ( = 1) Figure 1b: Ination and growth ( = 0:65)
Figure 2 simulates the relationship between ination and income inequality. We nd that
the relationship between ination and income inequality also follows an inverted-U pattern.
The coe¢ cient of variation of income is maximized at an ination rate of 12%. When the
ination rate increases from the benchmark value of 2.5% to 12%, the percent change in the
coe¢ cient of variation of income ranges from 0.10% (in the case of  = 0:65) to 0.12% (in
the case of  = 1). When the ination rate is above 12%, any further increase in ination is
associated with a decline in income inequality.
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Figure 2a: Ination and inequality ( = 1) Figure 2b: Ination and inequality ( = 0:65)
Finally, we consider the relationship between ination and the utility of the households
that have a wealth share of unity (i.e., sz;0(h) = 1).27 This benchmark case corresponds to
social welfare in a model with a representative household. Figure 3 plots the utility-maximizing
ination rates for " 2 [0; 1]. Unlike many previous studies that do not feature innovation and
creative destruction,28 the Friedman rule does not hold in our Schumpeterian model, and the
welfare-maximizing nominal interest rate and ination rate are both positive. As shown in Chu
and Cozzi (2014), the Schumpeterian growth model features a negative externality of R&D in
the form of a business-stealing e¤ect. Therefore, an increase in the ination rate that reduces
R&D may improve welfare. Furthermore, in this Schumpeterian model with endogenous entry,
an increase in the ination rate has an additional positive e¤ect on welfare by increasing the
frequency of entries. Khorunzhina (2015) estimates that the degree of external habit " on leisure
is about 0.95, which corresponds to a welfare-maximizing ination rate of about 14% in the
case of  = 1.
Figure 3a: Utility-maximizing ination ( = 1) Figure 3b: Utility-maximizing ination ( = 0:65)
27In Section 6, we will explore how the wealth share sz;0(h) a¤ects the utility-maximizing ination rate.
28See for example Wong (2016) for a recent study that considers a new monetarist model with heterogeneous
agents and the accumulation of human capital as an endogenous growth engine.
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5.3 How wealth inequality a¤ects ination and growth
In this section, we explore how the wealth share sz;0(h) of a household determines its utility-
maximizing ination rate (h). We nd that an increase in sz;0(h) leads to a decrease in (h).
Intuitively, given that a households consumption is increasing in its wealth, the negative asset-
value e¤ects of ination are stronger for wealthier households, which in turn prefer a lower
ination rate. Figure 4 plots the negative relationship between sz;0(h) and (h) for the case
of " = 0:95. Given that the householdspreferences on the ination rate are single-peaked, the
median voter theorem applies. Suppose the wealth share owned by the median household is
sz;0(m). Then, an increase in sz;0(m) would a¤ect the equilibrium growth rate in the economy by
decreasing the ination rate that is preferred by the median voter and selected in a majority-rule
voting system. Figure 5 plots the relationship between sz;0(m) and the equilibrium growth rate
g(m) that corresponds to the utility-maximizing ination rate of the median household. As
sz;0(m) increases, the ination rate preferred by the median household decreases, which in turn
causes the equilibrium growth rate to increase initially until reaching the growth-maximizing
ination rate of 5% after which the equilibrium growth rate decreases.
Figure 4a: Ination and wealth share ( = 1) Figure 4b: Ination and wealth share ( = 0:65)
Figure 5a: Growth and wealth share ( = 1) Figure 5b: Growth and wealth share ( = 0:65)
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6 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a Schumpeterian growth model with two dimensions of het-
erogeneity among households and rms. We model household heterogeneity by assuming that
households own di¤erent levels of wealth, which in turn generate an endogenous distribution of
income. We model rm heterogeneity by assuming random quality improvements and a cost of
entering a market, which together generate an endogenous distribution of implemented qual-
ity improvements. Both the income distribution and the implemented quality distribution are
a¤ected by monetary policy. Within this monetary growth-theoretic framework, we nd that in-
ation has inverted-U e¤ects on both economic growth and income inequality. Furthermore, we
calibrate our model to match the growth-maximizing and inequality-maximizing ination rates
that are estimated using cross-country panel data. We also simulate the utility-maximizing
level of ination and explore how it is a¤ected by the wealth holdings of households.
Finally, our model could feature scale e¤ects as in the rst-generation R&D-based growth
model in Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion
and Howitt (1992).29 We sidestep this issue by normalizing the supply of labor to unity.
Alternatively, one can remove scale e¤ects in the Schumpeterian growth model by considering
the semi-endogenous-growth approach in Segerstrom (1998) or the second-generation approach
in Peretto (1998, 2007). We leave this potentially interesting extension to future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. It follows from (14) that vet + ~
 1=
t t = (1 + i)t +
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t t. Di¤eren-
tiating both sides of this equation with respect to time t yields
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where the rst equality cancels td(~
 1=
t )=dt from both sides and the second equality uses
t = Q
(1 )=
t and t = Q
(1 )=
t . Using (A1) and Pr(  ~t) = ~
 1=
t , we modify (17) as
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et
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 1=
t t
+
1  

_Qt
Qt
  ~ 1=t t. (A2)
Similarly, we modify (24) for  = ~t as
rt =
(~t)
vt(~t)
+
1  

_Qt
Qt
  ~ 1=t t, (A3)
which uses the entry condition vt(~t) = t = Q
(1 )=
t and Pr(  ~t) = ~
 1=
t . From (A2)
and (A3), we have
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and
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from (11). Using (A4)-(A6), we also have
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1
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t (
~t   1) = 
1 + 
1
1 + i


, (A7)
which uniquely determines ~ > 1 independent of t because the left-hand side of (A7) is increasing
in ~t > 1 and the right-hand side is independent of t.
Proof of Lemma 2. In the symmetric equilibrium, we have vet (i; !i + 1) = v
e
t , which can be
expressed as
vet 
Z ~
1
0 f()d+
Z 1
~
[vt()  t] f()d =
Z 1
~
vt()f()d  Pr(  ~)t. (A8)
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Substituting the no-arbitrage condition for the value of an implemented innovation vt() =
[t() + _vt()  Pr(  ~)tvt()]=rt into (A8) yields
rt[v
e
t + Pr(  ~)t] = et +
Z 1
~
_vt()f()d  Pr(  ~)t
Z 1
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vt()f()d, (A9)
which uses (A8) and et 
R1
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t()f()d. Then, we use the R&D condition vet = (1 + i)t
to derive Z 1
~
vt()f()d = (1 + i)t + Pr(  ~)t. (A10)
Di¤erentiating both sides in (A10) with respect to t yieldsZ 1
~
_vt()f()d = (1 + i) _t + Pr(  ~) _t. (A11)
By substituting (A11) into (A9), with vet = (1 + it)t; we can obtain
rt[v
e
t + Pr(  ~)t] = et + _vet + Pr(  ~) _t   Pr(  ~)t[vet + Pr(  ~)t], (A12)
which is equivalent to (17).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (8) and (10) into (6) yields
Kt = (1  ) ytQt exp

 
Z 1
0
lnt(j)dj

, (A13)
which uses (13) for Qt. Given that t(j) > ~ for implemented innovations, the truncated
distribution function for implemented innovations is as follows:
~f()  f()R1
~
f()d
= ~
1
f(). (A14)
By this,
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Z 1
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lnt(j)dj
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(A15)
holds. Substituting (A13)-(A15) into yt = K1 t from (5) yields (22).
Proof of Lemma 4. Dene ~ct  ct=Q(1 )=t : Then, from (4), it holds that
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: (A16)
From (A3) and (A6), with vt(~) = 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Substituting (22) and (A17) into (A16) yields

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Given (29), the right-hand side of (A18) is always decreasing in t. To obtain the equilibrium
expression of t o¤ the balanced growth path, we will derive the total demand for nal goods.
First, we use (8)-(10), and to haveZ 1
0
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Then from (12), we have Z 1
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Combining (A19) and (A20) with the nal good market condition yields
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which also uses (22) for yt. Finally, by substituting (A21) into (A18), we have a one-dimensional
di¤erential equation in ~ct: Given that t decreases with ~ct; the right-hand side of (A18) is
increasing in ~ct: The dynamics of ~ct is saddle-point stable; i.e., ~ct jumps to the unique steady-
state ~c at t = 0: Accordingly, (A18) determines the stationary equilibrium value of ~
 1=
t as
in (30). Then, (A21) determines the steady-state value of ~ct as
~c =

1  1  
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Proof of Proposition 1. By (29) and (30), we have
~
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 =
~  1
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e(1 )=
  : (A23)
We naturally focus on a non-trivial case where ~
 1=
 > 0: There are, thus, lower and upper
bounds of ~; say   and +; such that ~
 1=
 > 0 holds if and only if ~ 2 ( ; +): Specically,
since
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 is an inverted-U shaped function in ~ and maximized at ~ = 1=(1   ): Then,   <
1=(1 ) < + holds. In addition, by (29), ~ is decreasing in i, thereby having an upper bound,
denoted as , due to i  0: It is easy to verify that  increases from 1 to1 as  increases from
0. When  is such large that  > 1= (1  ) holds, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship
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between i  0 and ~ 1=; noting ~ monotonically decreases with i  0: Then, when  is small
such that  < 1= (1  ) ; the relationship is monotonically negative for any i  0.
Di¤erentiating (23) with respect to ~ yields
dg
d~
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where we have used (A23). Note the following properties: (a) 1((1=(1 ))) > 0 and 2(1=(1 
)) = 0; (b) 1(~) is an uni-modal function (maximized at some ~ that is higher than 1=(1 ))
and 2(~) is a strictly increasing function; (c) 1( ) = 1(+) = 0; and (d) 1(~) is strictly
concave and 2(~) is strictly convex. Taking into account these facts, with a usual graphical
analysis, there must uniquely exist a threshold level of ~ 2 (1= (1  ) ; +); denoted as  in
the gure, under (above) which 1(~) > (<)2(~); that is, dg=d~ > (<)0: Recalling that 
increases with  and then ~ decreases with i; we can show that the relationship between i and
g is also inverted-U shaped (negative) if  is large (small).
Proof of Lemma 5. From (3), (4), and (35), we can show that sc;t(h) = sc;0(h) holds for all
t. Substituting this condition into (34) yields
_sz;t(h) =
ct   wt    t
zt
sz;t(h)  sc;0(h)ct   wt    t
zt
. (A25)
According to Lemma 4, fct, wt,  t, zt, mtg all grow at the same rate g in equilibrium. Using
(4) and (32), it is easy to obtain
ct   wt    t
zt
= rt   _zt
zt
=  > 0. (A26)
Therefore, the coe¢ cient on sz;t(h) in (A25) is always positive, which in turn implies that
_sz;t(h) = 0 for all t is the only solution of (A25) consistent with long-run stability. Finally,
imposing _sz;t(h) = 0 on (A25) yields the steady-state value of sc;t(h) given by
sc;0(h) = 1   [1  sz;0(h)]
c=z
, (A27)
where we can make use of (40) and (42) to derive
c
z
=
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~
1=
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 + 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. (A28)
Note that ~c is given by (A22).
Proof of Proposition 2. Di¤erentiating rz=w in (51) with respect to  yields
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Given  > =(1  ), (A29) shows that d(rz=w)=d > 0. From (47), we know d=di < 0. As a
result, there is a negative e¤ect of i and rz=w.
As for  < =(1  ), we will show that there are three possibilities: for a feasible range of
, (a) d(rz=w)=d < 0, (b) d(rz=w)=d > 0, or (c) d(rz=w)=d < (>)0 if  is smaller (larger).
Before proceeding, it is useful to note that there is an upper bound of  since i  0 with (47),
given by
+ 

1 + 
(1  )1=
e(1 )=| {z }
#
  :
We will derive a su¢ cient conditions for each case, by focusing on both ends of  2 (0; +].
First, by substituting ! 0 (i.e., the lower bound) into (A29), we can show that d(rz=w)=d >
0 holds at ! 0 if 
1  
=(1  )

<
2
#
. (A30)
Moreover, it is easy to derive d2(rzt=wt)=d
2 > 0 when  < =(1 ). As a result, d(rz=w)=d >
0 holds for any  2 (0; +]. Given d=di < 0, in this case, there is a negative e¤ect of i on
rz=w.
Second, it is straightforward to verify that d(rz=w)=d < 0 holds at  ! 0 if (A30) is
violated. In this case, by substituting  = + into (A29), we can show that d(rz=w)=d < 0
also holds at the upper bound,  = +, if and only if
1  
=(1  )

> #

#

2
= (1  ) +

1  2
= (1  )

. (A31)
We know d2(rzt=wt)=d
2 > 0 when  < =(1   ). As a result, d(rz=w)=d < 0 holds for any
 2 (0; +]. Given d=di < 0, in this case, there is a positive e¤ect of i on rz=w.
Finally, if (A31) does not hold, there is a threshold value of  below (above) which d(rz=w)=d <
(>)0; i.e., there is a U-shaped relationship between i and rz=w. Therefore, the e¤ect of i on
rz=w can be negative, positive, or U-shaped.
Proof of Proposition 3. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we focus on the non-trivial case
where ~
 1=
 > 0, implying ~ 2 ( ; +) unless  = 0: Recall that 1 <   < 1= (1  ) < +.
By (29) and (44), we have
rz
w
= (+ g)~
(1 )=
"
~  1= (1 + )
~  1 +



#
(e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= . (A32)
By di¤erentiating this with respect to ~,

d (rz=w)
d~
=
~(+g)0
(+g)
+ 1 

+ ~

~ 1=(1+)
~ 1
0
+ 

0
~ 1=(1+)
~ 1 +



 	(~), (A33)
where  > 0 is a composite variable that is strictly positive.30 Here, we can derive from (23)
and (A23) some components of 	(~) as
~(+ g)0
(+ g)
=
~
+ g
1  

"
~
 1=

~
+

ln ~+ 

~
 1=

0#
; (A33a)
30Here   ~wrz .
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
~
 1=

0
=
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
 
~  1
~
1=
!0
; (A33b)
 
~  1
~
1=
!0
=
1

1  (1  )~
~
1+1=
; (A33c)
 
~  1= (1 + )
~  1
!0
=   
1 + 
1
(~  1)2 ; (A33d)
and
0 =

~
1=
0 
~
 1=


+

~
1=

~
 1=

0
: (A33e)
By evaluating these at ~ 2 f ; +g and substituting them into (A33), we can obtain31
	(~) = 1

1 (1 )~
~ 1

1 


ln ~+ 

+ () (1+)

~
1=
(~ 1)
(1+)~ 1

| {z }
	1(~)
+ 1    (1+)~ 1
~
~ 1| {z }
	2(~)
(A34)
which reects ~
 1=
 = 0 for ~ 2 f ; +g with (30). For ~ =  , 	1(~) > 0 always holds due
to   < 1=(1   ), but 	2(~) 7 0. For ~ = +, both 	1(~) < 0 and 	2(~) > 0 hold due to
+ > 1=(1  ).
Given that ~
 1=
 is independent of ,   and + are also independent of . Thus, changes
in  a¤ect (A34) only through the second term of 	1. Keeping ~ = f ; +g unchanged, it
is possible to make 	(~) larger (smaller) as one needs by increasing , since the coe¢ cient of
	1,
1 (1 )~
~ 1 , is positive (negative) for
~ =   (~ = +). Therefore, for a su¢ ciently large ,32
	( ) > 0 and 	(+) < 0 hold; rz=w is rst increasing and eventually decreasing in ~ on the
feasible domain of ~. As we already mentioned, by (29), ~ has another upper bound, , due to
i  0. Since, by (29),  is decreasing in  and satises lim!0  = 1, we can also prove that
rz=w rst increases and eventually decreases with i on the feasible domain of i, by taking an
appropriately small value of  so that  > 1= (1  ).
31We provide the detailed derivations of (A34) in an unpublished appendix; see Appendix D.
32It is worth noting that there exists a su¢ cient condition for the lower bound of  to be less than 1.
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Appendix B: Data and regression results
Table B1: Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Panel A World Income Inequality Database
Economic Growth 612 5.670 9.752 -26.946 32.453
Income Inequality 448 8.143 3.927 4.280 35.240
GINI Coe¢ cient 448 29.693 4.967 22.500 55.433
Ination Rate 612 2.315 1.839 -4.480 12.678
Unemployment 612 7.309 3.803 1.805 27.466
Openness 612 1.007 0.777 0.167 4.416
Investment Prole 612 8.432 1.568 4.236 10.000
Corruption 612 7.249 1.718 3.333 10.000
Interest Rate 501 6.388 3.576 0.200 20.679
Panel B World Bank
Economic Growth 740 6.366 10.582 -32.872 37.465
Income Inequality 452 8.300 4.082 4.280 35.240
GINI Coe¢ cient 452 29.943 5.293 22.500 55.433
Ination Rate 740 2.420 2.068 -4.480 12.678
Unemployment 740 6.937 4.060 0.700 27.466
Openness 740 1.014 0.718 0.167 4.416
Investment Prole 740 8.410 1.590 3.333 10.000
Corruption 740 6.801 1.921 3.333 10.000
Interest Rate 601 6.637 3.641 0.200 21.167
Notes: Income Inequality and GINI Coe¢ cient are from the WIID. The former corresponds to the income
di¤erence between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of the population. Investment Prole and Corruption are
two measures of investment risks, which are obtained from the International Country Risk Guide.
Table B2: E¤ects of ination on economic growth and income inequality (IV regression)
WIID WB
growth income inequality growth income inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
it 8.063** 0.490*** 0.281** 10.056** 0.502*** 0.286**
(3.213) (0.130) (0.131) (4.110) (0.133) (0.134)
2it -0.787** -0.016*** -0.011** -0.994** -0.016*** -0.011**
(0.324) (0.004) (0.005) (0.417) (0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 19.475 36.428 36.428 12.716 36.438 36.438
weak instrument (F-statistic) 12.897 47.083 47.083 7.400 47.375 47.375
country xed e¤ect YES YES YES YES YES YES
control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
observations 501 326 326 601 330 330
Note: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1 and 4 correspond
to the GDP growth rate. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 use di¤erent measures of income inequality. Specically, columns 2
and 5 correspond to the income di¤erence between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of the population. Columns
3 and 6 correspond to the Gini coe¢ cient. In the rst (last) three columns, high-income countries follow the
classication by the WIID (WB). The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic reveals
that our strategy passes the under-identication test. Also, the F-statistic of the weak-instrument test is above
the critical value in Stock and Yogo (2005), which suggests that we can reject the weak-instrument hypothesis.
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Appendix C: The generalized model
This appendix presents the key equilibrium conditions for the model with elastic labor
supply under the utility function in (54). Equation (3) is the same, and labor supply is
wt (1  Lt (h)) = ct (h) (1 + 'it) . (C1)
The conditional demand functions for labor and intermediate goods are respectively
wt = yt=Lt, (C2)
Kt = Lt
h
(1  )Qt=

~e
i1=
, (C3)
where Lt 
R 1
0
Lt (h) dh. From (C3), the aggregate production function can be derived as
yt = Lt

1  
~e
(1 )=
Q
(1 )=
t . (C4)
Substituting (C4) into (25), (30) can be revised as follows:
~
 1=
 =
~
 (1=+1=)
1 + i

1 + 
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
L  , (C5)
where the condition for ~ in (29) remains unchanged. We substitute (C2) into (C1) to de-
rive yt (1  L) =L =  (1 + 'i) ct. Combining this condition with the resource constraintR 1
0
ct(h)dh+
R 1
0
xt(j)dj +
R 1
0
Rt(j)dj + ~
 1=
t = yt and (C4), we obtain


1  
~e
(1 )=
(1  L) =  (1 + 'i) ~c, (C6)
where
~c =

1  1  
(1 + ) ~

1  
~e
(1 )=
L 

 + ~
 1=
. (C7)
Based on the CIA constraint bt(h) + 'ct(h) = mt(h), (31) can be revised as
_zt(h) = rtzt(h)  it[mt(h) bt(h)]+wtLt(h)+ t ct(h) = rtzt(h)+wtLt(h)+ t (1 + 'it) ct(h),
(C8)
where zt(h) = at(h) +mt(h). Aggregating (C8) for all h, we have
zt = rtzt + wtLt +  t   (1 + 'it) ct. (C9)
In this generalized model, we know that sc;t(h) = sc;0(h) still holds for all t. Given this condition,
we combine (C8) and (C9) and use (C1) to derive
_sz;t(h) =
(1 + ) (1 + 'i) ct   wt    t
zt
sz;t(h)  (1 + ) (1 + 'i) sc;0(h)ct   wt    t
zt
. (C10)
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Using (4), (C1) and (C9) , it is easy to obtain [(1 + ) (1 + 'i) ct   wt    t] =zt =  > 0. As
a result, we know _sz;t(h) = 0 for all t with long-run stability. Imposing _sz;t(h) = 0 on (C10)
yields the steady-state value of sc;t(h) given by
sc;0(h) = 1   [1  sz;0(h)]
(1 + ) (1 + 'i) c=z
, (C11)
where we can make use of (40), (42) and mt(h) = bt(h) + 'ct(h) to derive
c
z
=
~c
~
1=
(1 + i) +  + + '~c
. (C12)
From (C8), income earned by household h is given by
It(h) = rtat(h)  tmt(h) + itbt(h) + wtLt(h) = rtzt(h) + wtLt(h)  'itct(h). (C13)
Aggregating (C13) yields total income earned by all households given by
It = rtzt + wtLt   'itct. (C14)
Combining (C13) and (C14) and using (C1), (38) can be revised as follows:
sI;t(h) =
sz;0(h) rtzt + wt   [(1 + )'it + ] sc;0(h)ct
rtzt + wt   [(1 + )'it + ] ct . (C15)
The distribution of income share sI;t(h) has a mean of one and the following standard deviation:
I;t =
rtzt
wt
  [(1+)'it+]
(1+)(1+'it)
zt
wt
1 + rtzt
wt
  [(1 + )'it + ] ctwt
z, (C16)
where
rt
zt
wt
= (+ g)
h
~
1=
(1 + i) +  + + '~c
i (~e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= ,
ct
wt
=
~c(~e)(1 )=
(1  )(1 )= .
Therefore, we can solve the six endogenous variables
n
~, , L, ~c, sc;0(h), I
o
using (29), (C5),
(C6), (C7), (C11) and (C16).
We impose balanced growth on (54) to derive the steady-state utility function as
u (h) =
1


ln c0 (h) +
g

+  ln [1  L (h)]  " ln (1  L)

, (C17)
where c0 (h) is the balanced-growth level of consumption at time 0. Substituting c0 (h) =
c0sc;0 (h) into (C17) and then normalizing the initial Q0 to unity yield
u (h) =
1


ln ~c+ ln sc;0 (h) +
g

+  ln [1  L (h)]  " ln (1  L)

, (C18)
where we make use of (C1), (C2) and (C4) to derive
1  L (h) =  (1 + 'i)
(1  )(1 )=
h
~csc;0 (h) (~e
)(1 )=
i
.
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Appendix D (not for publication)
Derivations of (A24). Di¤erentiating (23) with respect to ~ yields
dg
d~
=
1  


(ln ~+ )0~
 1=
t + (ln ~+ )

~
 1=
t
0
, (D1)
which naturally yields (A24).
Derivations of (A34). Applying ~
 1=
 = 0,  = 0; or g = 0 to (A33a)(A33e) yields
~(+ g)0
(+ g)
=
~
+ g
1  


ln ~+ 

~
 1=

0
, (D2)

~
 1=

0
=

~
1  (1  )~
~  1 , (D3) 
~  1= (1 + )
~  1
!0
=   
1 + 
1
(~  1)2 , (D4)
and
0 =

~
1=

~
 1=

0
, (D5)
in which we have used for

~
 1=

0
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
=
~
 1=
+ 
(~  1)=~1=
=
~
1=
~  1 (D6)
from (A23) and ~
 1=
 = 0. Substituting these into (A33) yields
	(~) =
~

"
1  


ln ~+ 

+ ()
(1 + )

~
1=
(~  1)
(1 + )~  1
#
~
 1=

0
+
1  

  
(1 + )~  1
~
~  1 .
(D7)
Combining (D3) and (D7) yields (A34).
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